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Since 1970 the distribution of wages in the United States has become substantially more unequal
(Katz and Murphy 1992).  “Between-group” inequality has risen since 1980, whereas within-
group inequality has increased more or less steadily since 1970.  Because the rise in inequality has
occurred against a back-drop of more or less stagnant real wages on average, various labor market
groups experienced a decline in real wages over all, or part of, the post-1970 period.
Economists have written extensively about the post-1970 rise in wage inequality and its
causes, with varying degrees of success.  It is fair to say, however, that virtually all of this literature
treats the post-1970 period  as  self-contained;  or, if  historical  context  is  offered,  it is  usually
restricted to the post-1940 period. The purpose of this paper is to place the recent rise in wage
inequality in a much longer historical context, one covering essentially the full sweep of American
history since the onset of industrialization, defined for my purposes to be the 1820s.  In keeping
with the literature on the current period, the primary focus is on “skill” based wage inequality –
for example, differences associated with occupations, or other indicators of human capital.
Why view the recent rise in wage inequality through a (very) long-term lens?  A long-term
historical context is useful in assessing whether the recent rise in wage inequality is an unusual
event in and of  itself, and whether levels of inequality observed today are unprecedented, as some
scholars believe them to be.  It is also useful in determining whether there have been secular trends
in inequality, or whether inequality change has been primarily episodic. The causes of changing
wage inequality, as well, may be unique to the institutional setting of each historical period, or there
may be continuity in explanatory factors. Answers to such questions have implications for theories
of economic development in the short and long run, and possibly for economic policies to address
both the causes and consequences of inequality change.
This paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 examines issues of measurement and
evidence; it also summarizes the relevant portions of  the influential  and  well-known  study  by
Williamson and Lindert (1980). The remainder of the  paper discusses  recent  research on  the
history of wage inequality, dividing up the chronology in terms of sub-periods (1820-1860, 1860-
1900-1900-1940, and 1940-1970).
MEASUREMENT AND EVIDENCE
Ideally, measurement of the level (or change) in wage  inequality  should  be  based  on  the full
distribution of wages.  Due to the influence of the Mincer model in labor economics, numerical
measures of the distribution of  log wages (eg. the variance) have been widely used in studies ofthe post-1970 rise in wage inequality.  Also popular are various range statistics that measure the
distance (in logs) between various quantiles of the wage distribution, such as the 10-90 spread.
Prior to 1940, however, it is extremely difficult  (though  not  impossible,  see  below)  to
analyze wage inequality other than in terms of differences in average wages between various labor
market  groups.1  Virtually  all analyses of  pre-1940  patterns of  wage  inequality  are based  on
occupational averages; in particular, the ratio of average wages in a skilled occupation, typically
blue collar,  to  average  wages in  an  unskilled  occupation  (eg.  common  labor,  manufacturing
operatives)2  The  implicit—albeit  somewhat  dubious—assumptions  are that occupations  are a
reasonable proxy for skills and  that within and between-group inequality generally have trended
together, so that one (or the other) can serve as a proxy for overall inequality.3
Students of late 20
th century labor markets have an abundance of data on wages, much of it
individually-based, with which to study levels and changes in wage inequality.  The public use
microdata  samples  (or  PUMS)  of  the  1940  and  subsequent  decennial  censuses  provide
information on weekly wages in the year preceding the census, as well as data on weeks worked.4
At annual frequencies trends in wage inequality in recent decades are frequently studied using the
Current Population Survey.  CPS microdata samples are available continuously since the early
1960s.5  
                                                
1 This is because the 1940 census was the first in American history to collect national data at an individual level on
earnings and labor supply (weeks worked).
2There is also the issue of pay period.  Studies of post-1940 wage inequality typically focus on hourly or weekly
wages, whereas studies of pre-1900 wage inequality frequently make either explicit or implicit use of daily wages.
Hours of work per day have declined substantially since the mid-19th century which, by itself, would not cause any
biases.  However, there is some evidence that high-wage workers in the late 19
th century worked fewer hours than
low wage workers, while the reverse is true today (Costa 1998).
3Williamson and Lindert (1980, pp. 80-81) report regressions of various overall indicators on income inequality on
the skilled-unskilled wage ratio over the period 1913-34; the coefficient of the skill differential is always positive
and highly significant statistically.
4Because the census is taken only every ten years, it is important to keep in mind the position of the economy in
the business cycle when interpreting level and changes in inequality derived from the PUMS., trends in inequality,
as derived from the PUMS.  The 1940 census, taken at the end of the Great Depression, is an obvious case in point.
It is also important to keep in mind inconsistencies of measurement across the various PUMS.  For example,
wages and weeks worked on so-called “work relief” jobs were counted in 1940, even though relief workers were
(according to the Census) unemployed.  Work relief wages were determined by the so-called “security wage” concept
and, strictly speaking, are not comparable with private sector wages.  It is possible to exclude persons on work
relief at the time the census taken, as well as some who were so employed in 1939, but it is not possible to exclude
everyone who held such jobs in 1939; see Margo (1988).
5The CPS was first conducted during World War Two, and then on a regular basis beginning in 1947.  However, as
far as I am aware, individually-based CPS data are not publically available (and may not survive) prior to the early
1960s.Other commonly used contemporary sources include the National Longitudinal Survey, the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, and the Survey of Income and Program Participation.As  noted earlier,  by  far  the  most  abundant  pre-1940  data  on  wages  are  those  that
correspond  to  specific  occupations.  Until  recently  (see  below)  most  historical  studies  of
occupational wage differentials have made use of various government surveys, or archival records
pertaining to specific locations.  For example, two government surveys that provide a wealth of 19
th
century wage data are the so-called Weeks and Aldrich reports. The Weeks reports, named after
Joseph Weeks, was conducted as part of the 1880 census whereas the Aldrich report, named after
Senator Nelson Aldrich, was conducted in the 1890s as part of congressional debate over tariffs.
The Weeks  and  Aldrich  reports  were  similar  in  method  and  industrial  coverage;  in
particular, both were collections of payroll records of manufacturing firms in existence at the time
of the surveys.6   By arranging the data according to the date of the payroll it is possible to use
either source to construct occupation-specific time series of nominal wages.7  The data are reported
as firm averages (by occupation and industry).  The pay period varies, but most observations refer
to daily or hourly wages. 
Notwithstanding their more or less continuous use since the late 19
th century, the Weeks
and Aldrich reports suffer from a number of serious (and well-known) deficiencies.  Because the
data are firm-level averages, within-firm differences are unknown.  Information on worker and job
characteristics is extremely limited.  Both samples are biased in terms of geographic coverage:
broadly speaking, coverage is best for the Northeast and the East North Central states, and very
limited for other census regions.
Perhaps the most important question of bias concerns  the retrospective  nature of  both
surveys.  Technically, the samples are unbalanced panels, with the length of the panel dependent on
when the firm first came into existence and whether it survived long enough to be sampled.  On an
apriori basis it seems likely that firms that came into existence long before the date or either survey,
but surviving to be included in either source, are an unbiased cohort sample of all firms.  Even if
selectivity were not an issue, sample size is: the number of observations dated 1850 or before falls
off drastically, particularly if the samples are stratified by occupation or region.8
                                                
6The precise methods by which firms were selected into both samples cannot be determined exactly from the
published documentation, but it is clear that neither was a random sample in the modern sense.
7Both reports also contained abundant data on prices;  Coehlo and Shepherd (1974), for example, use the        Weeks      data
to construct regional price indices for the second half of the 19
th century.
8For example, the number of usable observations in the Weeks report with which to calculate an average daily wage
of unskilled labor in 1832 is exactly two. The        Weeks      and      Aldrich      reports do not exhaust 19
th century wage data
in published government sources..  A large scale survey of Massachusetts wages was conducted by Carroll Wright
in the early 1880s, the results of which were published by the Massachusetts State Department of Labor in 1886.
Somewhat unusual for 19
th century wage surveys, the Wright study includes a relatively wide array of skilled
occupations, as well as farm wages.  Like the Weeks and Aldrich reports, Wright canvassed firms in existence at the
time the survey was taken, and thus the Massachusetts data potentially suffers from selectivity biases analogous to
those that afflict the Weeks and Aldrich reports.  Unlike the        Weeks      or      Aldrich      reports, the Massachusetts dataBecause of the deficiencies in these government sources, economic historians interested in
the evolution of the wages over the  course  of  the 19
th  century have  supplemented  them with
archival data.  One well-known example would be Walter Smith’s (1963) study of wage rates on
the Erie Canal.  The payroll records of the Canal survive in abundance, such that Smith was able to
calculate modal daily wages for common labor, masons, carpenters, and “teamwork”.9    Other
important archival studies include those by Adams (1968,  1970, 1982, 1986)  and  Rothenberg
(1992).
By the early 20
th century occupational wage data were routinely collected  by  state and
federal agencies.  These data have served  as  the basis  for  various  computations  of  aggregate
nominal and real wage series differentiating between skilled and unskilled workers of various types
Most of the relevant series (eg. Douglas 1926; Long 1960;  Rees  1961)  can be  found  in  the
Bicentennial Edition of Historical Statistics of the United States (US Department of Commerce
1975).10
Williamson and Lindert (1980)
Although perhaps the majority of economists today are unfamiliar with the pre-World War
Two sources  discussed  above,  some  may be  more familiar  with  the  1980  book  by  Jeffrey
Williamson and Peter Lindert, American Inequality: A Macroeconomic History.  Williamson and
Lindert’s book had two goals. The first was to present a comprehensive overview of the “stylized
facts”: namely, what was known quantitatively about changes in inequality over time in the long
sweep of American  history?  The second was to explain changes in inequality over time.   Here the
organizing principle was the so-called “Kuznets curve”, the notion that inequality first rises, and
then falls, over the course of economic development. Was there an American Kuznets curve; and, if
so, when did the curve rise and when did it fall?
From an explanatory point of view, Williamson and Lindert dispensed with Kuznets’ two-
sector framework, substituting instead explicit computational general equilibrium (CGE) models.
These models were “small” in terms of sectors and factor inputs, but it was still necessary to
simulate them.  Since many of the relevant parameters for the 19
th century could not be calibrated
readily from primary sources Williamson and Lindert substituted 20
th century parameters in many
                                                                                                                                                           
include some information on worker characteristics and seasonality but, unfortunately, no information on the
location of the firms within the state.
9Although Smith apparently calculated averages, his published series pertained to modes.  He noted, however, that
there was very little differentiation in pay across workers at the Canal within a given occupation, so that the mode
was an accurate summary statistic of central tendency.
10Revisions to some of these series, as well as newly constructed series, will be included in the forthcoming
Millennial edition of      Historical Statistics      (Carter and Sutch, et. al., forthcoming).simulations.  An especially important example (see below) concerns capital-skill complementarity,
which Williamson and Lindert assumed was true of 19
th century manufacturing before the Civil
War.  For the purposes of  the CGE models, “inequality” meant the skill differential, primarily
(although not exclusively) defined in “artisanal” (that is, blue collar) terms.
Williamson has been a pioneer in the application  of  CGE  models,  and  his  book  with
Lindert was the earliest that I am aware of  that examined long-term trends in wage inequality in the
context of an explicit economic framework.  However, it is important to note that the book broke
no new ground in terms of data collection.  Williamson and Lindert’s contribution to the “facts”
consisted of assembling together the relevant studies, as well as constructing a variety of long-term
inequality series by splicing together shorter series for different sub-periods.  The principal such
series, giving the ratio of wages of skilled-blue collar workers to those of “common”, or unskilled
labor covered the period 1816 to 1970.
When this series, among others, were graphed against time, they revealed, according  to
Williamson and Lindert, a distinct inverse-U pattern – the Kuznets curve.  The rising portion of
was dated to the period 1820 to 1860 (see Figure 1).   Wage inequality drifted upwards after 1860,
peaking at some point in the late 1920s, after experiencing a sharp, but transitory, decline during
World War One.  Inequality fell sharply and more or less continuously between 1929 and 1950,
followed by a period of stability (1950 to 1970). We know now, of course, that inequality rose
sharply in the 1980s, but it must be remembered that Williamson and Lindert had no  way of
knowing that at the time.
In terms of the CGE model,  the driving  forces  behind increases or  decreases in  skill
differentials were factor supplies and technical change which caused, shifts in the relative (skilled-
to-unskilled) demand for, or supply of, of labor.  The explanation for the rising portion of the
curve was  early industrialization,  and  high  rates of  capital  accumulation,  prompted by  falling
relative prices of capital goods. Lacking direct 19
th century evidence,  Williamson  and  Lindert
assumed  that the technology  of  early industrial  enterprises was characterized  by  capital-skill
complementarity.  Hence, increased capital accumulation led to a rise in the relative demand for
skilled labor.  Factor supplies were assumed to be relatively inelastic in the aggregate, so the rise in
relative demand led to a rise in the skill differential.
At other points in time, technical change was more rapid outside the industrial or service
sectors.  For example, Williamson and Lindert attributed the decline in skill differentials between
1929 and 1950 to more rapid growth in total factor productivity in agriculture, assumed to  be
intensive  in  the  use  of  unskilled  labor.    Factor  supplies  also  mattered:  for  example,  skill
differentials increased in the early part of the 20
th century because of high rates of immigration,
which swelled the ranks of unskilled labor.Williamson and Lindert’s book has been criticized from both a theoretical and empirical
perspective.  James and Skinner (1985) argued, on the basis of production functions estimated
using mid-19th century census data, that capital and unskilled labor were relative complements, not
capital and skilled labor (see also Goldin and Katz 1995).  Grosse (1982) suggested a number of
reasons why Williamson and Lindert’s inference that skill differentials rose between 1820 and
1860 was unwarranted (see also Margo and Villaflor 1987).  Goldin and Margo (1992a; see also
Goldin and Katz 1999b) questioned whether Williamson and Lindert’s “linked” sample of skill
differentials  adequately  measured trends  from  the 1920s  to  the  1960s;  their  paper,  as  well,
implicitly questioned Williamson and Lindert’s explanation for declining skill differentials after
1929, focusing instead primarily on factors associated with World War Two (see below).  More
generally, the CGE approach, by its very nature, has relatively little to say about how institutional
aspects of labor markets  (eg. unions), government policy, and macroeconomic events have affected
wage inequality in American history.11
NEW EVIDENCE ON ANTEBELLUM SKILL DIFFERENTIALS
Largely due to the influence of Williamson and Lindert’s work, a new project was launched in the
early 1980s to collect additional archival data on wages in the 19
th century.  Thus far, the data
collection phase of the project has been completed for the 1820 to 1860 period.12   The primary
data source was Reports of Persons and Articles Hired, a  collection  of  payrolls stored  at the
National Archives, perhaps the largest collection of its kind for the 19
th century United States.
During the 19
th century the United States Army maintained forts and outposts throughout
the country.  At many (in fact, most) of these installations it proved necessary at various times for
the quartermaster at the post to hire civilians from the local labor market to perform tasks for which
soldiers could not be spared (or did not have the skills to perform).  At the end of each month,
quartermasters were required to prepare a summary payroll (the “Report” which the title of the
collection refers to) documenting the hiring of civilian workers, including pay and some worker
and job characteristics.  Approximately 62,000 wage observations have been collected and put into
                                                
11 Government behavior can be considered in the CGE model, however, to the extent that government policies
altered factor supplies (for example, the closing of the frontier in the late 19
th century, or the cut-off in immigration
during World War One) or technical change (for example, through government funded research and development).
Because the model is cast in real terms, the effects of nominal shocks or other macro-economic events cannot be
readily addressed. However, there is considerable evidence of nominal wage lags well before the Civil War that were
non-neutral with respect to occupation; see Margo (1999, ch. 7).
12 Preliminary analyses of data collected during the first phase of the project were reported in Margo and Villaflor
(1987), Margo (1992), and Goldin and Margo (1992a), and the completed analysis is scheduled to appear in book
form in  Margo (1999). The NSF has recently funded a proposal to complete the second phase of the data collection
(1860 to 1900).machine-readable form.13  The data cover all regions of the country -- including the far West --
and a wide variety of occupations found in civilian life (as well as a few specific to the military,
such as “Indian spy”).
Of course, these data would  be  of  little  interest  to  anyone –  except,  perhaps,  military
historians – if wages paid to the Army’s civilian employees were arbitrarily set, independent of
labor market conditions in the civilian economy.  However, there is considerable evidence that the
army did not behave this way; rather, it appears to have simply paid the going wage in the local
labor market surrounding the  fort,  conditional  on  occupation  (see  Margo  and  Villaflor  1987;
Margo 2000, ch. 2)  Thus, for example, a comparison of wages paid to common laborers and
teamsters,  or  carpenters  and  masons, at the Erie Canal,  with  workers  in  employed  in  these
occupations at forts in upstate New York evidences no differences between the two.
Although  the  size,  occupational,  and  geographic  coverage  of  the  sample  are  a  vast
improvement over wage data previously available for the  antebellum  period,  the sample is  not
sufficiently large to estimate, say, annual time series of average wages by occupation at each fort.
Few forts were operated continuously over time, and none hired every type of worker in every year.
Computation of a wage series – for example, by averaging wages across forts in a given occupation
– that ignored these compositional shifts could be highly misleading. To deal with this problem,
hedonic  (log)  wage  regressions  were  estimated,  pooling  the  data  over  time,  within  broad
occupational groups and census regions.  Using the coefficients of the year dummies from these
regressions, in  conjunction  with  benchmark  wage  estimates  for  1850,   annual time  series  of
nominal daily or monthly wages were constructed for period 1821 to 1860, for three occupational
groups (common labor, skilled artisans, and clerks) in each of  the four  major census  regions
(Northeast, Midwest, South Atlantic, and South Central) – a total of twelve nominal wage series
(Margo 2000, ch. 3).
 Using previously collected regional data on prices, real wage series were constructed. With
additional cross-sectional information, it proved possible to benchmark regional wage  levels  in
1850 so that differences in real wage levels across regions could be incorporated into the time
series.  Finally, making use of revisions to the 19
th century labor force statistics recently completed
by Thomas Weiss (1992), the regional series were aggregated to the national level.  Five year
averages of the real wage series,  with each occupational series indexed to 100 in 1856-60, are
shown in Table 1.  Also shown are growth rates ($) of the series, estimated as the coefficient of a
linear time trend in a time series regression of the log wage (ln w = " + $t + ,).
It is immediately evident that real wage growth was positive before the Civil War.  Rather
more significantly, when the occupational series are aggregated into a single overall series the trend
                                                
13Here, an “observation” refers to the occurrence of a wage – typically, daily or monthly – in a payroll.growth rate of the aggregate real wage (0.97 percent per year) matches almost exactly the best
current estimate of the growth in real output per worker (0.99 percent per year) between 1820 and
1860 (Weiss 1992).
It is also evident from Table 1 (see also Figure 2) that the real wages of skilled artisans did
not grow more rapidly than the real wages of unskilled labor, contrary toWilliamson and Lindert’s
(1980) claim. In Chapter 3 of Margo (1999; see also Margo and Villaflor 1987) I demonstrate that
various biases and errors of construction in Williamson and Lindert’s series of skill differentals
account for their (apparent) finding of an antebellum “surge” in the ratio of wages of skilled
artisans and common labor. However, the new data do suggest that the wages of clerks (the major
white collar occupation of the period) increased at a moderately faster pace before the Civil War
than wages of common labor (see Table 1 and Figure 3). Nineteenth century clerks (almost all of
whom  were  male)  were  frequently  involved  with  accounting  and  management  tasks  of  the
enterprises; they were, in other words, the “educated” workers of their day, on a fast track to
upper levels of management (such as these were).  Although the spread of the factory system may
not have enhanced the relative wages of skilled artisans, it is entirely plausible that managerial skills
and capital were relative complements.   The working hypothesis, then, is that the relative demand
for educated labor rose before the Civil War; and, because the relative supply of such skills was
less than perfectly elastic, the skill differential (measured in white collar terms) increased.  
Furthermore, economy-wide estimates of the clerk-to-unskilled wage  for  the 1850s  are
similar  to estimates for the 1890s (Margo 2000, ch. 7; Goldin and Katz 1999b). As Goldin and
Katz demonstrate (see the next section), the expansion of secondary schooling after the turn of the
20
th century dramatically reduced the returns to educated labor, and a further reduction took place
in the 1940s (Goldin and Margo 1992a; see below). Although much more work needs to be done,
a Kuznets-curve in the relative wages of educated labor may be accorded the status of a stylized
fact of American economic development.  
THE CIVIL WAR AND POST-BELLUM PERIOD, 1860 TO 1900
The wage history of the Civil War and subsequent post-bellum period has received less detailed
scrutiny than either the ante-bellum period or the 20
th century – an unfortunate state of affairs, for
there are good reasons, as noted earlier, to believe that the standard wage sources for the period –
the Weeks and Aldrich reports -- are  less  than fully satisfactory.    Nevertheless,  both  reports
provide  the  primary  evidence  from  which  various  scholars  have  constructed  series  of  skill
differentials covering the 1860 to 1900 period.
Figures 4 and 5 graph two such series, one computed by Burgess (1920) covering the
1860 to 1890 period, and the other by Williamson (1975) covering the 1860 to 1900 period.   Skilldifferentials remained more or less constant during the Civil War but began to drift upwards late in
the 1860s.  According to the Burgess series, the upward drift continued through the 1870s before
tapering off in the 1880s; the Williamson series, however, suggests a much more modest overall
increase in skill differentials over the second half of the 19
th century.14  
As noted repeatedly in this paper, almost all wage inequality in 19
th century US history rely
on trends in aggregate skill differentials.  However, for at least a portion of the 1860 to 1900
period it is possible to shed some  light  on  changes in  wage  differentials  at a  lower  level  of
aggregation. The focus is on manufacturing over the period 1860 to 1880, a period of substantial
change in technology and organizational form that led to increases in firm size and market power --
the beginnings of the rise of the modern corporation (Atack 1985).  I use firm-level data from
samples collected from the manuscript censuses of manufacturing in 1860 and 1880 by Jeremy
Atack and Fred Bateman, as well as data from a special census inquiry – the so-called “Census of
Social Statistics” – in 1860 that reported extensive wage information at the level of minor civil
divisions.15   Taking the manufacturing data first, the 1880 sample is straightforward to analyze,
because it  reported the average  daily wage  of  common labor and  the average  daily wage  of
“mechanics”, or skilled (blue-collar) labor.  In 1860, however, the manufacturing census reported
the “average monthly cost of male labor”.  It is possible to restrict both samples to firms in full-
time operation, here assumed to be 12 months, and it is also possible to restrict both samples to
firms employing only male workers. Finally, using the  data from  the 1860  Census  of  Social
Statistics, it is possible to restrict attention to firms that plausibly employed mostly – or totally –
unskilled labor, thus rendering comparisons possible between 1860 and 1880.
Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the distribution of the log of unskilled
daily wages in 1860, as computed from the social statistics and manufacturing data, as well as for
1880.  The social statistics sample comprises minor civil divisions in eight states, two from each of
                                                
14Interestingly, if the post-1860 Williamson series is spliced onto the Margo (1999) shown in Figure 2, the
artisan-to-common wage ratio rose by about 11 percent from the late 1840s to the late 1890s, but was virtually the
same in the 1890s as in the 1820s. However, following the Williamson series into the 20
th century, however, skill
differentials rose quite markedly between 1900 (a value of 1.825) to 1916 (1.989) – as noted earlier,  period of
substantial growth in the relatively supply of unskilled labor, due to high rates of immigration.
15In 1850, 1860, and for a final time in 1870, the US Census Office conducted a special inquiry at the level of
minor civil divisions called the “Census of Social Statistics”.  Data were collected by census enumerators on a wide
variety of miscellaneous social indicators (for example, churches by denomination, newspapers, libraries) and, in
addition, on wages.  In particular, data were collected on the average daily wages of “common” (unskilled) nonfarm
labor and carpenters, both without board, and both pertaining to male workers only.  However, appearances are
somewhat deceiving, for the wage data were not true averages; rather enumerators seem to have asked a few
knowledgeable individuals -- most likely, employers -- what the going rate of pay was.  At the level of a minor
civil division, it is likely that the data are quite similar to firm-level observations, an inference born out by
comparison with the manufacturing data for 1860 (see Table 2).the major census regions; for comparison purposes, the manufacturing samples are limited to firms
located in these states.  The daily wage of unskilled labor in manufacturing  is defined to be:
daily wage, mfg = (Average monthly cost of male labor/number of male workers)/25.8
where “25.8" is the presumed number of days of operation of full-time firms.  Crucially for the
analysis, the manufacturing wage is constrained to fall between the 1rst and 99
th percentiles of the
log wage distribution computed from the social statistics sample.  As is apparent, the two 1860
distributions match up reasonably well: depending on how the labor input is computed, the sample
means are similar, as are the standard deviations (although the variation in  the social statistics
sample is slightly smaller than across manufacturing firms).16    
Panel B computes the change in manufacturing wage inequality between 1860 and 1880.  It
is clear that inequality increased, whether measured by the change in the standard deviation, or in
the various range statistics shown.  Table 3 repeats  the exercise  using  the full manufacturing
samples; the results are substantively unaffected.
Why did manufacturing wage inequality increase between 1860 and 1880?  Location is one
reason: the South’s loss in the Civil War produced an apparent widening in its per capita income
gap with the North (Easterlin 1960; Barro and Sali-i-Martin 1992), and it is plausible that this
effect was at work in the case of manufacturing wages.  Table 4 reports the effect on the standard
deviation of the log wage in both years, controlling for various factors reported in the sample,
including state, urban-rural status, and industry.  Clearly state (and to a lesser extent, urban-rural)
differences in wages grew between 1860 and 1880; further analysis of the regression coefficients
(not  shown)  demonstrates  that the principal  change was,  in  fact,  an  increase  in  the  gap  in
manufacturing wages between the South Atlantic and the rest of the nation (cf. Wright 1986).17
Location, however, may not have been the only factor at work.  Regressions (not shown) on
the 1880 sample reveal a positive effect of capital intensity and firm size on the daily wage of
unskilled labor.  The variances of both variables increased between 1860 and 1880, suggesting that
                                                
16Elsewhere (Margo 2000, ch. 4) I have shown that there is no evidence of substantial wage gaps for unskilled
labor between the farm and non-farm sectors, whether non-farm refers to manufacturing, or in more general terms,
in 1850 and 1860.
17It is important to note that a North-South wage gap did not      first       emerge after the Civil War, but apparently in the
1830s (Margo 2000, ch. 5). The Civil War, in other words, exacerbated a gap already present.  The role of region in
this instance highlights an important difference between the 19
th and 20
th centuries; most analyses of wage
inequality since 1970 effectively assume an integrated “national” labor market, an assumption that would be less
than fully appropriate for the pre-1940 period.the emergence of large scale, capital intensive firms may have produced a widening dispersion of
manufacturing wages.18
CHANGES IN WAGE STRUCTURE, 1900-1970
1900 to 1940
Although  some  features  remain  murky,  there  is  abundant  evidence  that  the  wage  structure
compressed between the turn of the twentieth century and 1940.  Factors that have been suggested
to account for the compression include changes in immigration policy, educational expansion, and
unionization.
A number of attempts have been made to chart the evolution of the wage structure from the
turn of the century to World War.  Early studies by Douglas (1926), Lebergott (1947),  Ober
(1948), Bell (1951) and especially Keat (1960) relied, for the most part, on skill differentials to
build a case. As an example, Ober (see also Keat 1960) computed wage ratios using annual data on
skilled and unskilled workers in the building trades (all of which were unionized) from 1907 to
1947, along with a broader set of skilled occupations at various dates over the same period.  He,
like the others cited above, found substantial declines in skill differentials in the 1940s, but also an
earlier period of decline ca. World War One.  Because of various deficiencies in the data sources
used in these studies, however, the timing of change remains unclear.
For white collar occupations, the most comprehensive early studies were made by Paul
Douglas.  Douglas estimated wage series for low-level managers and “ordinary” clerical workers,
such as typists, stenographers, and book-keepers.  Using these series in conjunction with others on
unskilled labor, Douglas argued that there was a substantial decline in the relative wages of white
collar workers before 1930.  In explaining this decline, Douglas pointed to educational expansion
which, he claimed, substantially increased the relative supply of educated workers after the turn of
the century – workers who were well-trained to enter white-collar occupations in the burgeoning
service economy of the early 20
th century.
Recent work by Goldin and Katz (1995, 1999a, 1999b) has significantly expanded our
knowledge of pre-1940 trends in the wage structure, as well as clarify the timing of important
changes. First, using industry data from1890 (from the federal census of manufacturing) along
with similar data collected by the BLS circa World War Two, Goldin and Katz show that the
                                                
18Why firm size and capital intensity were positively correlated with wages is unclear.  The correlations may
indicate that more able workers – albeit “unskilled” – were more likely to be employed in large scale, capital
intensive firms; or that the work environment in such firms was undesirable, and to compensate the firms had to
pay higher wages; or that such firms competed for workers in a labor market (or markets) that, for whatever reason,
was less than perfectly integrated with the general market for unskilled labor, and the supply curve of unskilled
labor to large scale, capital intensive firms, in the aggregate, was upward sloping.distribution of wages compressed among production workers within manufacturing (see Panel A
of Table 5)  Since there is, at present, no evidence that the inter-industry wage structure changed
between  1890  and  1940, Goldin  and  Katz’s  result  suggest  a  more  general  compression  in
manufacturing wages occurred as well.
Second, Goldin and Katz (see also Goldin and Margo 1992b) re-analyzed the white collar
wage data used by Douglas,  and  also  extended  and  revised  standard wage  series  for  college
professors and engineers (see Table 5 for highlights).  Unlike the Douglas series, which display a
decline in the wages of white collar workers relative to unskilled labor just after 1900, the Goldin-
Katz series suggests that much of the initial decline occurred ca. World War One.  Remarkably,
this initial decline remained in place throughout the 1920s and (except for brief increases in the
early 1930s) through the Great Depression, before undergoing an additional decline in the 1940s.
Also, it is important to note that, as economically  and  quantitatively  significant  as  the “Great
Compression” of the 1940s was (see below), the pre-1940s declines in skill differentials were
substantially greater (approximately twice as large),  occurring over a much longer period.  Goldin
and  Katz’s  (1999)  have  also  produced  series  of  annual  wages  for  college  professors  and
engineers; these, two, suggest that a substantial compression took place before 1940 (see Panel B
of Table 5).
Third, Goldin and Katz (1999a) have made use of the manuscripts of 1915 Iowa  state
census which reported information on education and income, the only known pre-1940 census-like
survey to do collect both variables.  Based on a cluster sample of approximately 60,000 individuals,
Goldin and Katz estimate standard earnings functions.  These suggest that the returns to schooling
were quite high in early 20
th century Iowa, roughly on the order of 15 %, depending on age and
schooling level.  Interestingly, these returns were not confined to the non-farm economy; evidently
the productivity of farmers, as well, benefitted from  educational  expansion.   Goldin  and  Katz
estimate similar equations from the 1940 and 1950 PUMS, restricting the sample to Iowa.  While
the results confirm a decline in the returns to schooling in the 1940s, they also suggest an even
larger decline took place between 1915 and 1940.
Which factors account for the post-1890 wage compression  in  manufacturing,  and  the
decline in the returns to schooling (and closely related decline in the white collar wage premium)?
Although the evidence at present is not complete, the wage compression in manufacturing appears
to be due to secular declines in immigration (which decreased the relative labor supply of low-
skilled labor), unionization, and educational expansion.
In particular, the so-called “high school movement”, which began in the late 19
th century
and which Goldin and Katz attribute to the high returns to education around the turn of the century,greatly expanded  the relative  supply  of  educated  labor.19    Some  high  school  graduates were
absorbed into the “high-tech” industries of the day, while others flooded the market for office
work.  In addition, high education also began to grow, although similar rates of expansion in the
relative supply of college-educated labor were a product of the post-World War Two era.
The Great Compression and the Post-WWII Experience: 1940 to 1970
Williamson and  Lindert’s (1980) analysis of the American “Kuznets Curve” suggested a sharp
decline  in  skill  differentials  between  1929  and  1950.    Because  this  decline  appeared  (to
Williamson and Lindert) to be a smooth one, they emphasized secular forces rather than episodic
ones.  More recent work on this period, however, suggests that the decline in wage inequality after
1929  was concentrated in the 1940s,  and had much to do with events surrounding World War
Two (Goldin and Margo 1992b).20
Precise dating and magnitudes of the so-called “Great Compression” have been difficult
to ascertain because of inconsistencies in the 1940 and 1950 published census volumes. An early
study by Herman Miller (1966) concluded, for example, that there was no decline in the ratio of
earnings of college-to-high school graduates between 1940 and 1950.  But,  in  a  clever  paper,
Bartlett (1978) showed that Miller was mistaken.  Using the public use sample of the 1970 census
Bartlett  constructed  pair-wise  consistent measurements  of  wage  inequality  between  1970  and
preceding censuses.  She found no change between 1950 and 1970 but concluded there must have
been a decline in the returns to schooling between 1940 and 1950.  However, Bartlett was unable to
measure the magnitude of the decline precisely.21
Goldin and Margo (1992b) extended Bartlett’s work by making use of extracts from the
public use samples of the 1940, 1950, and 1960 censuses.   Table  6  shows  various  summary
measures of the distribution of log (weekly) wages from Goldin and Margo’s extracts. Significant
wage compression is immediately apparent comparing 1940 and 1950. It is also clear that the wage
structure “bounced back” somewhat in the 1950s, but wage inequality was still much lower in
1960 than in 1940.
                                                
19However, the apparently similarity of clerk-to-unskilled wage ratios in the 1890s and the 1850s (see also Soltow
and Stevens 1981) suggest that the rate of return to schooling was quite high long before the high school
movement began – which raises the question as to which factors evidently inhibited widespread educational
expansion prior to the late 19
th century.
20For additional discussion of the wage structure covering the interwar period and World War Two, see Ferguson
and Galbraith (1998).
21Doing so would have required Bartlett to have access to microdata samples from the 1940 and 1950 censuses,
which were not available when she wrote her paper.The PUMS, then, clearly suggest a substantial reduction in wage inequality in the 1940s.
But, the compression could have merely been the continuation of a  trend that began long before
the 1940s, or possibly a response to a temporary disequilibrium induced by the Great Depression.
Although a complete, or nearly so, reconstruction of the evolution of the  wage structure in
the 1920s and 1930 remains to be done,  Goldin and Margo (1992b) were able to produce several
new series of skill differentials. One such series, pertaining to clerks and common labor employed
on Class I steam railroads (see Figure 6), suggests that wage inequality increased in the early years
of  the  Depression,  but  by  1939  had  returned  to  1929  levels,  suggesting  that  the  “Great
Compression” really was an episode associated with World War Two.22
Goldin and Margo’s explanation of the Great Compression emphasizes "demand-supply"
factors as well as government intervention.  To take the latter first, compression was at least partly
the result of wartime price controls.  First instituted in 1942, the price controls were under the
purview of the National War Labor Board (NWLB).  The NWLB adopted a number of rules of
thumb when deciding whether to allow wage increases in  particular  industries; many of  these
clearly compressed the wage structure at the left tail (for example, exceptions were most frequently
granted for cases in which the NWLB thought that "substandard" wages were being paid).
In addition, the war expanded the relative output of industries that were relatively intensive
in the use of less-educated labor (eg. manufacturing) and reduced the relative output of industries
that were intensive in the use of educated labor (such as college teaching).  It is hard to factor out
the precise effect of wartime demand and the NWLB, but Goldin and Margo attempted to do so by
examining wage distributions of war and non-war related industries, before, during, and after the
war. These distributions  do  suggest  that the NWLB  controls  tended  to  compress  left  tails;
however, it is also clear that compression continued after the war; and that the relative earnings of
high skilled workers – the right tail – also compressed during, and after the War.
Why, then, did compression continue after the war? Goldin and Margo (1992b) examined
trends in the relative demand for workers by education level between 1940-80; the 1940s were
relative to the other decades, a decade of substantial increases in the relative demand  for  less-
educated workers (see also Autor, Krueger and Katz, 1998).  But this shift in demand was short-
lived; the 1950s  and  1960s  were  decades of  substantial  increases in  the relative  demand for
educated workers.  This suggests that certain supply shifts may have been were important: (1)
there was an unexpected increase in the supply of educated labor after the war, caused the GI Bill,
which financed the educations of soldiers and (2) there was a narrowing of geographic differences
                                                
22 This is somewhat surprising, because unemployment rates were still very high in 1939, and unemployment was
more prevalent among the less-skilled.  A high level of unemployment might be expected to reduce the wages of
the currently employed,     ceteris paribus     ; and thus cause the skill differential to rise; see Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994).in the quality of schooling during the first half of the twentieth century, which also probably was a
source of some compression.  Other factors that functioned on the demand side were increases in
the level and coverage of the  federal minimum wage, level and coverage, and growth in unions.
In sum, the “Great Compression” of the 1940s was a unique episode caused by factors
that were largely specific to the 1940s. The compression continued after the war for sometime but
was beginning to unravel by the early 1950s. However, little further change in wage inequality took
place in the 1960s, and in the  1970s  wage  differentials  by  education  and  experience  actually
declined, due to the entrance  into the labor of  the (relatively)  highly educated  “baby-boom”
generation. From the point of view of the early 1970s, then, it would have seemed that, for the post-
World War Two period – and, except for the 1930s, the pre-1940s portion of the 20
th century – the
general  trend  in  wage  inequality  was  downward.    No  wonder,  then,  that  economists  were
unprepared for the marked rise in wage  inequality  in  the 1980s, for  this  was a  phenomenon
evidently foreign to the history of wage inequality in America, at least as far as the 20
th century was
concerned.  
Although  skill-based  wage  inequality  today  appears  to  be  similar  in  levels  to  that
experienced on the eve of World War Two, it also appears to be somewhat lower than levels in the
early 20
th century. Further, the (percentage) increase in the relative supply of educated labor since
the early 20
th century been much larger than the (percentage) decrease in skill differentials.  Thus,
the relative demand for educated labor must have risen secularly over the full sweep of the 20
th
century, perhaps because, unlike their 19
th century counterparts, the new production techniques that
emerged  in  the early 20
th  century  –  as  well  as  today  –  were  characterized  by  capital-skill
complementarity (Goldin and Katz 1995).
CONCLUSION
This paper has surveyed recent research on the history of wage inequality in the United States over
the period 1820 to 1970.  There are several conclusions:
1. Over the course of the 19
th century, the ratio of wages of skilled blue collar workers to common
labor did not follow an inverted U pattern, as conjectured by Williamson and Lindert.  If anything,
the ratio declined before the Civil War.  However, after the Civil War, the ratio climbed to a level in
the late 1890s similar to the level in the 1820s, and continued to increase until World War One.
2. The ratio of wages of white collar workers to common labor did increase over the course of the
19
th century.  A significant portion of the increase took place before the Civil War, suggesting a
key role for the influence of early industrialization on the demand for “managerial” skills.3. There is some evidence that wage dispersion among unskilled labor in manufacturing increased
between 1860 and 1880.  While some of the increase was a consequence of a widening North-
South wage gap, increased dispersion in capital intensity and firm size – both aspects of the rise of
the modern corporation -- probably played a role.
4. Except for a brief period early in the century due to rapid increases in unskilled immigration,
wage inequality declined between 1900 and 1940. By substantially boosting the relative supply of
educated labor, educational expansion drove down the rate of return to schooling between World
War One and World War Two, and further erosion in returns took place in the 1940s.  Despite the
recent  rise  in  wage  differentials  by  educational  attainment,  the returns  to  schooling  today  is
probably somewhat lower than in the early 20
th century, indicating that the relative demand for
educated labor has risen secularly over the full sweep of the 20
th century.
5. The early years of the Great Depression witnessed a sharp rise in wage inequality.  But this
increase dispersed by the end of the decade such that, on the eve of World War Two, inequality
was probably no higher than in the late 1920s.
6. The “Great Compression” of the 1940s resulted in a substantial narrowing of wage inequality
within and between groups.  Although long-term supply side forces played a role in generating
wage compression, much of the decrease in inequality was associated with the effects of World
War Two on the relative demand for less-skilled labor, as well as government policies specific to
the War.
7. The wage compression that occurred in the 1940s was sustained for some time after World War
Two ended, but by 1960 inequality had begun to creep back towards pre-World War Two levels.
The baby boom, however, kept wage inequality from rising further in the 1970s.
8. With respect to the reasons posed in the Introduction for exploring historical context, it would
appear that the history of wage inequality in the United States is one of both episodes and secular
trends.  Broadly speaking, both the episodes and secular trends can be explained by shifts in the
relative demand and supply of labor of different skills. Some  factors that shifted demand and
supply  have  exhibited  some  continuity  over  time  –  for  example,  immigration  and  technical
change—while others—for example, the Civil War or government policies adopted during World
War Two – were specific to the era.   As far as government policy is concerned, there is compellinghistorical evidence that long-term expansion of educational opportunity has been a potent factor in
narrowing wage differentials.23
Although I believe these conclusions to represent a reasonable statement of the “stylized
facts” of the history of American wage inequality prior to 1970, there is still considerable room for
further research. As noted repeatedly throughout the paper, most of what we know about wage
inequality prior to 1940 -- especially before 1900 -- is really about inequality between groups, not
within groups. This paper has provided some suggestive evidence on trends in wage dispersion in
manufacturing during a portion of the second half of the 19
th century, and it may be possible to
extend the analysis to other sectors and other time periods, albeit in a (very) limited way with
presently available data sources.  A good deal of additional work on explaining historical changes
in wage inequality needs to be done – some, perhaps, along the lines of the CGE models pioneered
by Williamson and Lindert (1980) as well as exploring how various institutional (and non-skill
related) factors affected changes in wage inequality over time.24
                                                
23This presumes that expansion of the relative supply of educated labor does not alter the bias of technical change
in favor of educated labor; see Acemoglu (1998).
24As is surely obvious to all readers of this paper, I have had nothing to say about long-term trends in wage
differentials by race and gender, matters of great concern to labor economists.  On long-term trends in gender-based
wage differentials, see Goldin (1990); on racial differences, see Higgs (1977), Margo (1990), and Donohue and
Heckman (1991).REFERENCES
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Real Wage Indices, 1821-1860 (1856-60 = 100)
                             Common Labor               Artisans               Clerks
1821-25                     70.9                              73.5                     64.6
1826-30                     81.5                              89.1                     79.4
1831-35                     80.5                              88.6                     75.3
1836-40                     78.7                              81.9                     81.0
1841-45                   116.0                            112.3                   120.6
1846-50                   107.7                            102.8                   115.3
1851-55                   101.1                              97.5                   111.6
1856-60                   100.0                            100.0                   100.0
Growth Rate                1.04%                           0.73%                  1.52%
Source: Margo (1999, ch.3)Table 2
Log of Unskilled Daily Wage, 1860 and 1880: Eight State Sample
A. Distributional Statistics
Sample CSS MFG MFG MFG
Year 1860 1860 1860 1880
Entrepreneur
Counted?
na Yes No na
N 2,892 415 631 616
Mean      -0.042     0.042   -0.121   -0.016
F       0.196     0.240    0.261    0.381
q(10)      -0.288    -0.255  -0.542  -0.693
q(50)       0.000     0.099  -0.057    0.000
q(90)       0.223     0.328    0.215    0.405
B. Change in Wage Inequality, 1860 to 1880
Sample MFG MFG
Entrepreneur Counted? Yes No
)F 0.141 0.120
) 10-50 0.339 0.208
) 50-90 0.176 0.133
) 10-90 0.515 0.341
Notes: CSS: manuscript census of social statistics, eight state sample (MA, PA, MI, IA, VG, NC, KY, TN; see
Margo 2000); MFG, Atack-Bateman manufacturing samples; N = sample size (CSS, minor civil divisions; MFG,
firms); F, standard deviation; q(j), value of log wage at quantile j
Definition of unskilled wage: CSS, log of average daily wage of common labor without board; MFG, 1860 =
[average monthly cost of male labor/#male workers]/25.8; MFG, 1880: average daily wage of unskilled labor
Sample restrictions: MFG,1860: firms with at least 2 male workers and NO female or child workers, located in one
of eight states listed above; full time operation (12 months), log of daily wage, computed as above, must fall
within 1-99th quantiles of distribution of log of common wage, CSS sample [-0.693, 0.405]; MFG, 1880: same as
1860 except log wage is not restricted to 1-99th quantiles of 1860 CSS distribution.
Entrepreneur Counted?: if Yes, number of male workers is reduced by one; if No, number of male workers is as
reported.Table 3
Log of Daily Unskilled Wage, 1860 and 1880: National Samples
A. Distributional Statistics
Sample MFG MFG MFG
Year 1860 1880 1880
Entrepreneur Counted? Yes No na
N 1,120 1,921 1,815
Mean        0.090       -0.070        0.050
F        0.234        0.250        0.364
q(10)      -0.235       -0.437       -0.511
q(50)       0.151       -0.032        0.000
q(90)       0.370        0.256        0.405
B. Change in Wage Inequality, 1860 to 1880
Sample MFG MFG
Entrepreneur Counted? Yes No
)F 0.130 0.114
) 10-50 0.125 0.106
) 50-90 0.186 0.117
) 10-90 0.311 0.223
Note: Sample restrictions are same as Table 1 except sample is no longer restricted to firms in eight states listed in
Table 1.Table 4
Explaining the Change in Manufacturing Wage Inequality, 1860-1880
Dummy Variables
Included in Regression
F, 1860 F, 1880  ) F, 1880 - 1860
None   0.234   0.364   0.130
Urban   0.232   0.348   0.116  [ 12.1%]
State   0.230   0.323   0.093  [ 28.5%]
Industry   0.230   0.348   0.118  [ 10.2%]
Urban + State   0.229   0.312   0.083  [ 36.2%]




  0.082  [ 36.9%]
{0.081}[ 37.7%]
Partial, Urban + State +
Industry
 0.227   0.309   0.082 [ 36.9%]
Notes: Figures in columns 2 and 3 are standard deviations of log of daily mfg. wage, controlling for various
combinations of dummy variables  listed in column 1 in OLS log wage regression.  Figures in [ ] give percent of
change in standard deviation explained by the combinations of dummy variables.
Urban = 1 if firm located in urban area (citycode < 999).
Industry dummies refer to 3-digit categories.
Partial: excludes dummies that are insignificant at the 10 percent level.
{}: adds dummy forTable 5: Changes in Wage Structure, 1890-1940
A. Ratio of Earnings of Professionals to Wage and Salary Earners in Manufacturing (Males)
                    Bookkeepers           Full Professors             2
nd Year Engineers
1895                 2.278
1901                                                                                          2.104
1908                                                  4.159
1911                                                  3.747                               1.899
1916                                                  3.406                               1.598
1921                                                  2.686                               1.486
1924                                                  2.809                               1.472
1926                 1.604                        2.786
1938                                                  3.212
1939                 1.268
1940                                                  2.964
B. Wage Structure Changes for Male Production Workers in Manufacturing, 1890 and 1940:















1.64 1.33 1.67 1.48 2.75 1.97
Furniture 1.75 1.43 1.63 1.68 2.85 2.40
Iron&Steel 1.41 1.25 2.04 1.48 2.88 1.85
Soap 1.97 1.51 1.48 1.33 2.90 2.01
Tobacco 2.01 1.48 1.54 1.66 3.11 2.48
Source: see Goldin and Katz (1999b)Table 6: Summary Measures of Wage Structure, 1940 to 1960
                                                                       1940           1950           1960
Log of Weekly Wages
  90-10                                                       1.447           1.181          1.250
90-50                                                       0.654           0.504          0.567
50-10                                                       0.793           0.677          0.723
F
2                                                             0.325           0.259          0.275
College/High School
(6-10 yrs. exp.)                                        1.728           1.369          1.522
White Collar/All Non-farm                     1.256           1.177          1.192
Blue Collar/All Non-farm                       0.860           0.891          0.876
Professional/All Non-farm                      1.474           1.254          1.222
Laborer/All Non-farm                             0.630           0.750          0.736
Residual Variance (from
log wage regression)                               0.197           0.177          0.171
Source: Goldin and Margo (1992b)